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STATUTES PROHIBITING COST
RECOVERY FOR CANCELLED NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS: CONSTITUTIONAL?
PRO-CONSUMER?
CONSTANCE A. OLSON*
Electric utilities have a duty to meet the power needs of their service
areas.' To fulfill this duty, utilities estimate future power needs and
respond to predictions of increased consumption by constructing new
generating facilities, expanding current facilities, or purchasing power
from other utilities.2 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, forecasts3 of
high power need and the economic attractiveness of nuclear generating
plants4 prompted electric utilities to place over two hundred orders for
nuclear plants.' Lower than anticipated power consumption, escalat-
* B.S., Taylor University, 1980; J.D., M.S.W. (expected), Washington University,
1986.
1. See Sommers, Recovery of Electric Utility Losses from Abandoned Construction
Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 363, 374 (1982). See generally 1 A. PRIEST, PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 227-83 (1969) (obligation to furnish adequate
service).
2. See generally BERKSHIRE COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, EVALU-
ATION OF POWER FACILITIES: A REVIEWER'S HANDBOOK (1974) (reviews the entire
process of planning for power needs and selecting technology for future power needs)
[hereinafter cited as EVALUATION OF POWER].
3. Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and
Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 500-01 (1984).
4. See infra text accompanying note 111. See generally Larson, Present State and
Future Outlook of Nuclear Power Generation in the United States, 12 ATOM. ENERGY
L.J. 274 (1970) (describing the positive features and promises of nuclear power).
5. See CONG. Q., ENERGY POLICY 84 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY
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ing costs, and the effects of federal safety regulations 6 have forced the
cancellation of over one hundred nuclear plants.7
Nuclear generating plant cancellations raise the question of who
should pay for useless, abandoned plants. In most cases, consumers
have been assessed all or part of a utility's cancellation costs.8 In some
states, however, courts have interpreted and applied purportedly con-
sumer-oriented statutes to prevent cancellation cost recovery. 9 In re-
sponse, utilities are challenging the constitutionality of these statutes,
contending that failure to include prudently-incurred costs in their
rates is confiscatory.' °
This Note examines the interpretation, constitutionality, and effect
of statutes purporting to deny cost recovery for cancelled nuclear
power plants. Section I explains the ratemaking process" and its con-
stitutional boundaries. 2 Section II surveys the problems affecting the
vitality of the electric power industry. 3 This discussion explains why
the industry has experienced financial difficulties, and summarizes the
growth and demise of optimism regarding nuclear power as an eco-
nomical and safe power source. Section III examines administrative
and judicial treatment of utility costs recovery requests in cancelled
plant cases.' 4 Section IV analyzes the applicability of the statutory lan-
guage relied on to deny cost recovery in some states, 15 the constitution-
POLICY]. This figure includes plants that are licensed to operate, are licensed for test-
ing, or have construction permits issued or requested.
6. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
7. Kester, Money Problems Plague Nuclear Plants, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 8,
1984, at II, col. 6-7 (Atomic Industrial Forum data).
8. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.135 (1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4909.15
(Page 1977). Statutory denial of cost recovery is discussed infra at notes 139-59 and
accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 107,
447 N.E.2d 746, appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 47 (1983); Dayton Power & Light Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 91, 447 N.E.2d 733 (1983); Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 644 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983); Brief of Realtor,
Missouri ex reL Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, Case No. CV 183-1064cc
(1984) (appealing Commission decision in In re Union Elec. Co., Case No. ER-83-163
(1983)). These cases are discussed infra at notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 19-46 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 64-123 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 124-61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 162-84 and accompanying text.
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ality of such provisions, 16 and the probable impact of cost recovery
denial on consumers.1 7 Section V recommends that existing statutes
not be interpreted to cover cancelled plants, and offers suggestions for
preventing, and responding to, the cancellation phenomenon.' 8
I. THE RATEMAKING FORMULA AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO
RATE REGULATION
Electric utility regulation is largely the responsibility of state public
utility commissions (PUCs),' 9 which monitor utility operations, ade-
quacy of service and financial practices,20 and set maximum utility
rates.21 Regulation has displaced competition in the electric utility
market because a utility enjoys a natural monopoly; consequently, if an
electric utility desires to raise its rates it must file a rate request with its
PUC.22 In the rate proceeding, the PUC computes the utility's revenue
requirements23 based on evidence presented, and develops an equitable
16. See infra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
19. A state's regulatory agency also may be called a "Public Service Commission,"
or "Commerce Commission," or "Corporation Commission." In this Note, "Public
Utility Commission" (PUC) refers generally to the agency responsible for utility regula-
tion in any given state. See I A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 25-30.
20. Jones, Judicial Determination of Public Utility Rates: A Critique, 54 B.U.L.
REV. 873, 894 (1974); EVALUATION OF POWER, supra note 2, at 296.
21. See EVALUATION OF POWER, supra note 2, at 296-308. See also Comment,
Rates Follow Service: The Power of the Public Utility Commission to Regulate Quality of
Service, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1137, app. (1976) (charts give PUC title, source of author-
ity, jurisdictional description, and data on each state's method of computing allowable
utility rates); OFFICE OF UTILITY SYSTEMS, ECON. REGULATORY ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING THE IMPACTS OF CERTAIN ELECTRIC
UTILITY RATEMAKING AND REGULATORY POLICY CONCEPTS: REGULATORY LAWS
AND POLICIES (1980) (state by state analysis of electric utility regulatory policies).
22. Hanson & Davies, Judicial Review of Rate of Return Calculations, 8 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 499, 501 (1982). In addition to obtaining PUC approval of pro-
posed rate increases, a utility "must accept and abide by reasonable standards and prac-
tices to make sure that their facilities will promote the safety, convenience and best
interests of ratepayers, employees and the public generally." 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 1,
at 32.
For a history of the development of public utility regulation, see id. at 25-33; Jones,
Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the
States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 429-501 (1979).
23. 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 26 (1970). See infra notes 26-46
and accompanying text for a summary of this process.
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rate design.24 Similarly, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) regulates the interstate aspects of the electric power
industry.25
A. Calculating Utility Rates
When a PUC faces an electric utility's request for a rate increase, it
applies a formula that can be summarized as follows:
[Rate Base x Rate of Return] + Operating Expenses = Operating
Revenues.26
Only an order by a regulatory agency can alter the variables of this
equation. Most states, however, also provide for separate fuel adjust-
ment revenue that is automatically responsive, without PUC review, to
24. Jones, supra note 20, at 875. For discussions of rate design, a subject not treated
in this Note, see generally id, at 884-92; Huntington, The Rapid Emergence of Marginal
Cost Pricing in the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L. REV. 689
(1975); Lander, Public Utility Rate Design: The Cost of Service Method of Pricing, 19
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 37 (1974).
25. M. WALLACE & R. PENNOYER, DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 24 (1978). The Federal Power Commission (FPC) previously performed
FERC's role. The Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified at scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.), had created the FPC. The Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49
Stat. 803 (1935), gave the FPC control over the interstate sale of electricity. The De-
partment of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1)(B) (1982), transferred this
authority to FERC. See Note, The Constitutionality and Effectiveness of the Electric
Utility Provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of1978, 47 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 787, 788-89 (1979).
For a summary of the elements of the "federal energy policy for states" as contained
in the National Energy Act, see Woychik, State Opportunities to Regulate Nuclear
Power and Provide Alternate Energy Supplies: Part 1, 15 U.S.F.L. REv. 441, 444 n.15
(1981).
For a discussion of Title I (retail sales by electric utilities) of the Public Utility Regu-
latory Policies Act of 1978, see Joskow, Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978:
Electric Utility Rate Reform, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 787 (1979). See also FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of Titles I, III, and
§ 210 of Title II of PURPA; describes PURPA's content); Note, supra (effectiveness
and constitutionality of both Titles I and II of PURPA).
26. ECONOMIC Div. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., CON-
STRUCTION WORK IN PROGRESS IN ELECTRIC BASE RATE 33 (Comm. Print 1982)
[hereinafter cited as CWIP IN ELECTRIC BASE]. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 1 (explanations of rate
making process). See also Mello, Public Utility Rate Increases: A Practice Manual for
Administrative Litigation, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411 (1974) (describes ratemaking
and gives advice on preparing for trial of a rate case).
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changes in fuel costs.27 A PUC estimates a utility's revenue require-
ment by using a test year.2" This twelve-month period, which may
reflect actual or projected revenues,29 supplies data on the utility's ex-
penses, income, and investments for use at the rate hearing.3" Against
this analytical backdrop, the PUC calculates the values that it will plug
into its rate formula.3 1
The rate base represents the utility's investment in fixed assets that
are used and useful32 in providing electric service.33 While the value
can be computed in several ways, 34 most jurisdictions use the original
cost method, which sets the rate base at an amount equal to the origi-
nal cost of the investment, less depreciation, plus a sum for working
27. CWIP IN ELECTRIC BASE, supra note 26, at 33; CONG. Q., ENERGY POLICY 99
(1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY POLICY (1979)]. A given jurisdiction may allow
other types of adjustment clauses. See OFFICE OF UTILITY SYSTEMS, ECON. REGULA-
TORY ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING THE IMPACTS
OF CERTAIN ELECTRIC UTILITY RATEMAKING AND REGULATORY POLICY CON-
CEPTS: GLOSSARY 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GLOSSARY].
28. Huntington, supra note 24, at 699; Jones, supra note 20, at 876-81. A "test
year" figure approximates the "total revenues" that a utility is permitted to take in. 1
A. KAHN, supra note 23, at 26. "On the basis of this total, adjusted as much as possible
for known or readily predictable changes between the test year and the period for which
the rates are to be ascertained, the company is ordered or permitted to propose the
required adjustments in its rate schedules." Id.
29. GLOSSARY, supra note 27, at 96.
30. Huntington, supra note 24, at 699.
31. GLOSSARY, supra note 27, at 96.
32. Each state has its own standard for determining whether to include particular
utility investments in the rate base. Each state that employs "used and useful" language
has its own interpretation of that language's meaning. The following passage provides
insight:
Historically, the used and useful test was employed primarily to exclude the rate
base investments in plants that are not yet operable, investments in assets that pro-
vide benefits exclusively to parties other than consumers of regulated services, and
investments in plants that are no longer used because of obsolescence, chronic
mechanical failure, or an order from a government agency requiring termination of
operations for a sustained period of time.
Pierce, supra note 3, at 512-13. See also I A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 174-90 (used and
useful concept discussed).
33. Webb, Utility Rate Base Valuation in an Inflationary Economy, 28 BAYLOR L.
REV. 828, 840 (1976); GLOSSARY, supra note 27, at 85.
34. The reproduction cost method uses an estimate of replacement cost at current
prices to compute the rate base. GLOSSARY, supra note 27, at 85, 88. A fair value rate
base "is a judgment figure which may involve considering reproduction cost, original
cost, replacement cost, market value, assessed value, or other elements." Id. at 44.
While these methods, like the original cost method, focus on property value, the cur-
rent value method bases valuation on investment dollars, not property. The funds in-
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capital.35 Investments in generating plants and equipment constitute
roughly half of the utility's revenue requirement.3 6
The rate base is then multiplied by the rate of return,37 which repre-
sents the profit that the utility has an opportunity to earn 38 on its
base-the return on its investment.3 9  Some commentators view the
rate of return as a balancing element subjectively applied by PUCs to
ensure an overall fair result.' ° Generally, however, the PUC calculates
the rate of return by the cost of capital approach.4 1 This method iden-
tifies and totals the costs of each element of the utility's capital struc-
ture,42 which is composed of some proportion of debt and equity.4 3
The calculated cost should reflect the total amount the utility must pay
vested in utility facilities determine the rate base. Webb, supra note 33, at 840. See also
1 A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 140-66 (valuation formulas).
For an overview of the development of rate base calculation theories, see 1 A. KAHN,
supra note 23, at 35-41. This development has been intertwined with the constitutional
principles that govern utility regulation. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
35. Huntington, supra note 24, at 699.
36. Jones, supra note 20, at 895.
37. The rate of return is "the percentage by which a utility's rate base is multiplied
to determine the wages of capital." 1 A. PRIEST, supra note I, at 191. Setting an
equitable rate of return involves "reaching an acceptable compromise between the inter-
ests of investors on the one hand and consumers on the other." 1 A. KAHN, supra note
23, at 42. The rate of return must permit the utility to attract capital, but this standard
is "an elastic one." Id. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (cost of capital
approach and subjective elements).
38. While the rate of return generally represents "the return. . . to which investors
in the utility enterprise are reasonably entitled," 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 45, this
amount is not guaranteed and merely suggests potential utility earnings. Id. at 202, 22.
39. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 692-93 (1923).
40. Jones, supra note 20, at 882-83.
41. Mello, supra note 26, at 415. This may be deceptively objective, however, as
there are various methods available for calculating the cost of capital. Christy &
Christy, Does the Capital Attraction Argument Suffice?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 29,
1979, at 24, 25.
42. Jones, supra note 20, at 881. See also I A. KAHN, supra note 23, at 42-54 (eco-
nomic and regulatory issues in cost of capital calculations).
43. Mello, supra note 26, at 415. "This method involves a determination of the
utility's cost of embedded debt (that is, debt already committed to the enterprise) and
cost of equity. Those two costs then apply to the company's capital structure to arrive
at the composite cost of capital (overall rate of return)." Id. Debt capital represents
"funds obtained ...by borrowing money, primarily through the sale of bonds."
GLOSSARY, supra note 27, at 28. Equity is the portion of capitalization represented by
stock ownership. Id. at 41, 42.
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to procure capital."
The PUC then adds the utility's operating expenses to the product of
the rate of return multiplied by the rate base.45 Operating expenses
include depreciation, taxes, labor costs, materials, amortization of ex-
traordinary losses and other debts, insurance, and maintenance costs.46
When a PUC computes expenses and the other elements of the revenue
formula, it must act within certain constitutional constraints. The fol-
lowing section summarizes these constitutional principles.
B. Constitutional Limits on the Ratemaking Process
The PUCs' power to set rates is limited by constitutional prohibi-
tions against taking private property without due process of law or
without just compensation.47 Within constitutional limits, PUCs must
equitably resolve confficting consumer and utility interests.4" Regula-
tion may reduce the utility's property value and severely limit its return
on investments. 49 Nevertheless, the return calculated by PUCs must
fall within a "zone of reasonableness" and must not be confiscatory. 50
44. Huntington, supra note 24, at 700. Mello charts a simplifed cost of capital cal-
culation for a utility with a 60% debt ratio:
TYPE OF CAPITAL % OF TOTAL COST RATE COST OF CAPITAL
Debt 60% X 8% = 4.8%
Equity 40% X 10% = 4.0%
Total 8.8%
Mello, supra note 26, at 415.
45. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 45. See generally iad at 47-138; 1 A. KAHN, supra
note 23, at 26-35 (discussion and definition of operating expenses). Costs charged as
operating expenses are "charged directly and thus included in annual revenue require-
ments dollar for dollar." Id. at 27. Those costs are capitalized and recouped "in the
form of annual allowances for depreciation and return on the undepreciated portion of
the investment [rate base]." Id.
46. Hanson & Davies, supra note 22, at 501; GLOSSARY, supra note 27, at 74.
47. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51 (1936); U.S.
CONsT. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. States must permit judicial review of
administrative rate decisions where a taking is alleged. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben
Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920).
48. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968).
49. 390 U.S. at 769. Furthermore, a utility "has no constitutional right to profits
such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ven-
tures." Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 692-93 (1923). Neither does regulation "insure that the business shall produce net
revenues." Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 590
(1942).
50. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. at 585.
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The development of Supreme Court decisions on confiscatory utility
rates51 culminated forty years ago in two cases5 2 that form the Hope-
Bluefield test. Against this standard, courts examine confiscation
claims in utility rate cases.
The Hope-Bluefield test requires that a rate yield a reasonable return
on property that the utility uses to provide service to its customers.
5 3
Hope overruled the "fair return" on "fair value" method of setting util-
ity rates.54 Under Hope, courts examine the result reached rather than
the method employed; 55 hence a rate order is constitutional if its "total
effect" is just and reasonable.56 This result-oriented analysis requires
that a rate of return be adequate to: 1) preserve the utility's financial
integrity; 2) provide a return similar to that of other industries with
similar risks; 3) reward investors for the risks they assume; and 4) per-
mit the utility to remain attractive to investors and credible to lend-
ers.57 This constitutionally adequate return is customarily calculated
on the basis of property that the utility actually uses in providing ser-
51. For a brief history, see Hanson & Davies, supra note 22, at 531-36 (Changes
since the pre-1945 utility confiscation cases "make [the] broad standards insufficiently
focused to address the complexit[ies] of the 1980's.").
52. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Blue-
field Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
53. Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 690.
54. Parker, The Regulation of Public Utilities, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 828, 829
(1970). The inference is that "regulatory commissions may establish rates in any way
that willproduce reasonable end results." Id. (emphasis in original). Pontz & Sheller,
The Consumer Interest-Is It Being Protected by the Public Utility Commission?, 45
TEMP. L.Q. 315, 316-28 (1972) (criticizes the fair value rule, Pennsylvania's retention of
the rule, and notes other states' acceptance of the freedom to set rates using methods of
their choosing). The fair value rule originated with Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466
(1898), and applied in various confiscation cases predating Hope. "The net effect of
[Hope] was to significantly diminish the role that the judicial branch would play in
future litigation." Stiner & Cecara, Utility Asset Valuation, 23 S.D.L. REV. 326, 335
(1978). See also 1 A. KAHN, supra note 23, at 36-41 (history of rate regulation culmi-
nating with Hope); 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 489-93.
55. Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. Accord Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. at 575, 586; West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 70 (1935).
56. Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. See also Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 770.
57. Christy & Christy, supra note 41, at 24; accord Hope, 320 U.S. at 603; Bluefield,
262 U.S. at 692-93.
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the
value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to
that being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding
risks and uncertainties. . . . The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/9
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vice to customers; in most states, utility assets must be "used and
useful" to qualify for rate base treatment. 9
A utility seeking review of a rate of return that it alleges is confisca-
tory will carry a heavy burden of proof.' Courts will reverse a rate
order only if a utility clearly proves that the order's total effect results
in a taking.61 PUCs may exclude from the rate formula imprudent
expenditures-that is, those that are wasteful or made in bad faith.62
efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and en-
able it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.
Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 692-93. "mhe return to the equity owner should be commensu-
rate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That
return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of
the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital." Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
58. See Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 690; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19,41
(1909); Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546. The Constitution, however, merely requires that the
"end result" fairly compensate the utility. See supra notes 55 and 56.
59. See Avery, The Costs of Nuclear Accidents and Abandonments in Rate Making,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 8, 1979, at 17, 18. Avery notes two modern exceptions to the
"used and useful" requirement: inclusion of CWIP costs in the rate base before a plant
goes on line; and power outages in generating plants. Id In general, nuclear and coal
plants are unavailable 15% of the time due to unscheduled outages, 10% for scheduled
outages, and available for service 75% of the time. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY
CONSERVATION AND POWER OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH
CONG., IsT SEss., A PERSPECTIVE ON ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPACITY PLANNING 247
(Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as PERSPECTIVE].
60. Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 767; Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. A commission's order is
presumed valid unless the utility fulfills the "heavy burden" of showing that it is invalid
because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. One
commentator noted that "[i]f, for example, the revenues which a company has been
given an opportunity to earn will demonstrably not be enough to maintain its credit and
to attract capital, the regulatory agency's order should be struck down as confiscatory,
but the going will be ruggedly uphill." 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 493-94.
61. Hope, 320 U.S. at 602; St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 53. Adequate evi-
dence must exist in the record to support a confiscation claim. Beaumont S.L. & W.
Ry. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74, 89 (1930). See also Hope, 320 U.S. at 602 ("If the
total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial in-
quiry. . . is at an end."); St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 53 (utility must make "a
convincing showing" and a "court will not interfere with the exercise of the ratemaking
power unless confiscation is clearly established").
62. Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426,430-31 (1936); West Ohio Gas, 294 U.S. at
72. One author suggests that prudence "refers to good judgment relating to the need of
the procured service, material or equipment, the competitiveness of the price and gen-
eral vigilance exercised in the procurement process, and the overall care and wisdom
exercised in controlling capital investments and adding to the rate base." Gartman,
How "Prudent" Is the Investment?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 19, 1981, at 15, 16. See
also Pierce, supra note 3, at 511-12 (prudence in the context of determining whether to
construct a new generating plant).
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While PUCs generally include all prudent utility expenditures in the
rate formula, the Constitution does not mandate this; it simply requires
that the "end result" be just.63
II. FINANCIAL PROBLEMS FACING THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY
The ratemaking policy process is affected by actual power needs,
utility decision-making, and changing capital markets. Analysis of the
constitutional problems associated with nuclear plant cancellations re-
quires consideration of the recent changes affecting electric utilities and
the nuclear power industry.
A. Electric Utilities
Privately-owned utilities supply about eighty percent of this coun-
try's electric power needs."r Utility projects account for one-fifth of
the nation's total construction expenditures.6" The electric utility in-
dustry, the largest consumer of primary energy,66 is also the most capi-
tal intensive.67 Consequently, market and technology changes during
63. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
64. ENERGY POLICY (1979), supra note 27, at 98. Investor-owned electric utilities
account for 77% of the nation's total generating capacity; the federal government
(11.5%), nonfederal public bodies (10.5%), and rural electric cooperatives provide the
remaining generating capacity (1%-2%). Huntington, supra note 24, at 692 n.17. See
generally EVALUATION OF POWER, supra note 2 (details modem power systems and the
electric utility industry structure).
65. Utility Financing: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and
Power of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1981)
(testimony of Peter Navarro) [hereinafter cited as Utility Financing]. In addition, the
utility industry accounts for one-third of all long-term private financing in the United
States, and for one-half of all new common stock issued. Id.
66. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. ENERGY OUTLOOK: A DEMAND
PERSPECTIVE FOR THE EIGHTIES 258 (1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. ENERGY OUT-
LOOK]. Because electric utilities convert, rather than produce energy, they are both
consumers and suppliers. Id. at 243.
67. S. NOVICK, THE ELECTRIC WAR: THE FIGHT OVER NUCLEAR POWER 123
(1976). "An industry is capital intensive if the amount of investment needed to produce
a unit of revenue is greater than average." Webb, supra note 33, at 830.
As of 1980, investor-owned electric utilities had invested an average of $2.63 in
utility plant to support each $1 of annual revenue from kilowatt-hour sales. In
contrast, in 1980 General Motors Corporation had a fixed asset investment of 16
cents per dollar of sales revenue and Exxon had an investment in plant, property,
and equipment of 31 cents per dollar of sales revenue.
CWIP IN ELECTRIC BASE, supra note 26, at 24-25.
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the last two decades have especially affected electric utilities.
Until the mid-1960s, unit costs for electricity were declining, plant
construction was modest and easily financed, lead times for construc-
tion were short, and rate challenges were infrequent.68 Then the condi-
tions in the electric power industry changed drastically. 69 The per
kilowatt cost of plant construction skyrocketed and inflation outpaced
the economies of scale.70 Lead times for plant construction stretched,
in many cases, to ten years.7 I Power demands increased rapidly.72 En-
vironmental controls forced tremendous new costs and delays.73 The
capital markets tightened and utility bond ratings fell7' at a time when
utilities needed more outside capital to finance construction projects.75
Finally, during the 1970s, reduced power needs collided with escalating
costs, causing electric utilities to cancel many construction projects. 76
68. Hansen & Davies, supra note 22, at 506; Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, Regula-
tory Review of Electric Utility Plant Construction Programs in Ratemaking Context 67,
75 in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ELECTRIC POWER: CURRENT ISSUES IN REGULA-
TION AND FINANCING (D. Allen, Chr. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRIC POWER].
69. For an account of the response of one utility to the rapid changes, see Sillin,
Managing in Adversity: Utilities in an Inflationary Economy, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1,
1982, at 13.
70. ENERGY POLICY (1979), supra note 27, at 98-99; Hanson & Davies, supra note
22, at 506. In 1969, rising utility costs began to outstrip further technological gains, and
the average cost of electricity to the consumer turned upward. Since 1969, and particu-
larly during 1974, utility cost increases accelerated. Huntington, supra note 24, at 692.
71. S. NOVICK, supra note 67, at 123; Hanson & Davies, supra note 22, at 506.
72. Hanson & Davies, supra note 22, at 506.
73. In 1974, for example, environmental requirements consumed 9% of total capital
expenditures. Huntington, supra note 24, at 694. In one particular case, this amount
exceeded 50% of plant costs. Hanson & Davies, supra note 22, at 506 n.12.
74. See Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 83 (testimony of Peter Navarro); Foster,
Fair Return and Estimation, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 883, 904 (1976); Hanson & Davies,
supra note 22, at 506.
75. Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 15-19 (testimony of Matthew Holden).
76. CWIP IN ELECTRIC BASE, supra note 26, at 7. For these reasons, "99 new
electric plants either planned or under construction were canceled." Id. See also
Pierce, supra note 3, at 502-06 (events of the 1970s and 1980s affecting electric utilities).
For analyses of future power demand forecasting and estimates for the 1980s and
1990s see PERSPECTIVE, supra note 59; U.S. ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 66; Divi-
SION OF POWER SUPPLY AND RELIABILITY, ECON. REGULATORY ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, PROPOSED CHANGES TO GENERATING CAPACITY 1980-1989 FOR THE
CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES (1980); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., ELECTRIC POWER: AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE (Comm. Print 1978, N. Franssen) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRIC POWER: AN
UNCERTAIN FUTURE].
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Ambitious construction programs, long lead times, rising costs, and
inflation have presented many utilities with a capital crisis.77 Utilities,
forced to rely increasingly on outside capital sources, 78 must carefully
position the capital structure fulcrum between debt and equity.
79
Heavy borrowing burdens utility customers with high interest rates
8 0
and causes investor concern over high debt ratios.8 1 On the other
hand, utilities with high debt to equity ratios pay a high price for inves-
tors' perceptions of investment risk,82 because investors seek a return
77. See supra notes 70, 71, 73-76 and accompanying text. Some analysts also blame
regulation for exacerbating the industry's capital woes. See Utility Financing, supra
note 65, at 55 (testimony of John Bryson). If utilities could freely change their prices as
needed, investors might perceive fewer risks in utility investment. Foster, supra note 74,
at 929. One study demonstrated that utilities operating in less restrictive states have
lower capital costs than those in more restrictive states. Archer, The Regulatory Effects
on Cost of Capital in Electric Utilities, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 26, 1981, at 36.
78. Lerner & Breen, The Changing Significance of AFUDC for Public Utilities, Pun.
UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1, 1981, at 17. Rather than looking to the cash flow generated
through retained earnings as a source of funds, companies have borrowed additional
sums or drawn down their working capital to generate the funds required to pay their
dividends. Id. at 22.
79. See Mello, supra note 26, at 416. Too much debt makes a utility a riskier invest-
ment, which results in high costs of capital. Id. Too much equity inflates the cost of
capital because of the higher cost of equity. Id.
Equity is composed of preferred stock, which is easily calculable because it carries a
fixed yield, 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 208-09, and common stock, or "risk capital,"
id. at 209, which benefits from "all profits after fixed charges" but also has all "losses
come out of its hide." Id.
80. Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 19 (testimony of Matthew Holden).
81. Foster, supra note 74, at 899. Because creditors have a prior claim on earnings
and assets, the financial risk borne by the equity owner increases as the equity declines.
Id. The result is an even higher cost for equity, id., because the proportion of gross
income absorbed by debt requirement increases as the margin of protection afforded
bondholders decreases. Id. at 898.
82. Mello, supra note 26, at 416. "Most investors believe that equity investments
contain greater risks than debt instruments." Dukes & Chandy, Rate of Return and
Risk for Public Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 1, 1983, at 40. Inflation and a de-
creasing "drawdown ratio" (the proportion of gross income available for common eq-
uity) are major causes of the high cost of common equity. See Foster, supra note 74, at
904. Similarly, coverage ratios are falling:
The interest coverage ratio-i.e., the ratio of operating income to interest-has
fallen sharply, weakening the credit rating of the utility. The dividend coverage
ratio-i.e., the ratio of net income to dividends-has fallen to a point where divi-
dends are now greater than cash profits for over half of the companies in the
industry.
Lerner & Breen, supra note 78, at 23. These coverage ratio declines have been caused
by: "1) [T]he level and trend of earnings on total capital; 2) the rising ratio of long-term
debt to total capital; 3) the higher cost rate at which additional long-term capital has
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on their investment commensurate with the higher risk they assume in
the investment.83 Although analysts disagree on a prognosis for the
electric industry's capital ills, 4 it appears that investors consider some
been obtained; and 4) the rate of growth in new capital requirements." Foster, supra
note 74, at 888. A lower coverage ratio means less protection for creditors and lower
bond ratings. Id. Furthermore, utilities that sell more common stock to raise capital
dilute the earnings of current stockholders, Platt, The Electric Utility Outlook to the
Year 2000, PuB. UTIL. FoRT., Jan. 15, 1981, at 19, as well as the market value of their
shares, Foster, supra note 74, at 886.
83. See Foster, supra note 74, at 887.
The less the risk, the less the right to any unusual returns upon the investments.
One who invests his money in a business of somewhat hazardous character is very
properly held to have the right to a larger return. . than can be obtained from an
investment in Government bonds or other perfectly safe security.
Willcox, 212 U.S. at 48-49. Accord Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 307 (Brandeis, J., concurring). A recent study of utility
firms and PUCs demonstrates that the required return for utilities has increased in the
last ten years. Dukes & Chandy, supra note 82, at 41. Half of the utilities studied
indicated that the return on equity adjusted for inflation declined in the last decade. Id.
Two main categories of risk are associated with investment: business risk, which is
related to the fluctuations of a firm's operations, and financial risk, which relates to the
proportion of debt in the capital structure of the firm. Chandrasekaran & Dukes, Risk
Variables Affecting Rate of Return of Public Utilities, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 26, 1981,
at 33. Other risks include the investment market risk, inflation risk, money rate risk
(interest rates), and regulatory risk (lag, mistake, oppression). Christy & Christy, Who
Says Utilities are Less Risky?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 8, 1980, at 12-13.
Business risk includes all the economic, political, technological, and physical hazards
involved in an investment. Foster, supra note 74, at 897. Competition is a major source
of business risk. Id. at 902. Being a natural monopoly does not make a utility risk-free,
however, because other unique business risks confront utilities. Id. at 898. The need to
obtain large amounts of new capital, often without regard to the market conditions for
their securities and regulatory limits on their ability to readily adjust prices to offset
rising costs are risks unique to utilities. Id.
Financial risk, the other major risk factor, is associated with capital structure lever-
age. Id. The risk of business is unequally distributed, depending on what types of se-
curities it issues to the different investor classes, and investors are aware of their
position in the risk-ranking caused by the capital structure. Id.
84. One commentator, for example, demonstrates that actual earnings on utility eq-
uity were several points too low when considered in light of earnings on comparable
industrials. See Lerner, Competition for the Funds of Investors and the Cost of Capital
for Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 28, 1980, at 18. He notes that the median return
on a Standard & Poor's industrial in 1978 was 14.9%, while it was 13.2% for utilities.
Id. at 16.
Others contend that utilities are doing well, given that American industry is not in
the best shape at the present time. See CWIP in FERC Electric Rate Base: Hearing on
H.R. 5755 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CWIP in
FERC] ("Investment in utilities has recently increased, and the performance of some
utilities is very good."). Id at 14-15; Richards & Fraser, The Persistance of Public
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utilities risky investments.
8 s
An increasingly prominent factor in the electric industry's capital
saga is allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC).
AFUDC is an accounting method by which the financing costs of con-
struction work in progress on a new generating plant accumulate in an
AFUDC account and later are charged to the consumers who use the
electricity generated by the plant.16 Both debt and equity funds used to
finance construction are capitalized.87 Although the utility actually
receives no cash during the AFUDC accumulation period, the utility
records the amount as income.8 8 In recent years, AFUDC has greatly
Utility Profitability, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 14, 1980, at 36 (discusses data showing that
certain utilities have had consistently high profits).
Many utilities still are excellent investment choices. See Leckey, Good Buys in Elec-
tric Utilities, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 2, 1984, at 14A, col. 1. Others, namely
those "facing a dire nuclear situation," are not. Id. "Income speculators" may find
high dividends if they invest carefully in "the thrills and chills of the nuclear age."
Quinn, Utility Stocks in the Spotlight, NEWSWEEK, June 18, 1984, at 80.
Claiming that electric utilities are not "unambiguously riskier than industrials," one
analyst cautions that risk assessment should be done on a case-by-case basis." Beedles,
Are Utilities Less Risky? A Reexamination, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 4, 1983, at 28.
85. See Christy & Christy, supra note 83, at 12, 18. Investors and bond-rating agen-
cies have reacted adversely to changes in the electric industry. Lerner & Breen, supra
note 78, at 23-24. A survey of investment bankers revealed the factors relied on in
assessing risk and showed a consensus that utilities are risk investments. Chan-
drasekaran & Dukes, supra note 83. Consolidated Edison's one-time failure to pay
quarterly dividends "shattered" investor confidence; and, despite a remarkable recov-
ery, as of 1981 its stock still sold below book value. Robinson, Utility Fiascoes-Who
Should Pay?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 17, 1981, at 20. For a summary of the financial,
management, operating, and regulatory highlights of investor-owned utilities for the
past three years, see generally P.U.R. ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC AND
GAS UTILITIES (S. Johnson, ed. 1983).
86. Trout, A Rationale for Preferring Construction Work in Progress in the Rate
Base, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 10, 1979, at 22.
Under this method of accounting, the firm recovers the investment during the con-
struction period by capitalizing the interest costs of both debt funds used and an
imputed interest cost for the equity funds used. The firm receives cash income on
this investment once the project is placed in service through a return on rate base
and depreciation on the accumulated AFUDC funds.
Id at 22-23. It is the accumulation and subsequent recovery of AFUDC that results in
construction financing costs being allocated over time through rates to the customers
that actually receive the benefit of the construction. Re Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light
Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 197, 222 (Mass. D.P.U. 1983).
87. Lerner & Breen, supra note 78, at 17. These authors suggest that while capital-
izing the interest costs is a recognized practice, "[c]apitalizing the implicit equity costs
is a more questionable practice because no specific cash outlays are involved in the
process." Id.
88. Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 26 (testimony of Matthew Holden). The
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increased as a percentage of utility operating income, 89 causing inves-
tors to view many affected utilities as investment risks.9° This exacer-
bates the utilities' problems in securing outside capital.
In an attempt to circumvent the capital attraction problems associ-
ated with AFUDC, many states now permit an exception to the "used
and useful"9 1 rule: construction work in progress (CWIP).92 Under
CWIP, the utility recovers its return on the uncompleted plant during
the period when it actually incurs the construction financing costs.93
Current ratepayers, then, pay the financing costs for the plant before it
consequence is that "a growing proportion of the reported profits of utilities is not avail-
able to finance dividends, debt service charges, capital outlays, or any other expendi-
ture." Lerner & Breen, supra note 78, at 21.
89. AFUDC accounted for 3.9% of utility income in 1965. By 1975, this amount
had increased to 32%. Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 29 (testimony of Matthew
Holden). This figure stood at 46% in 1981. Id at 1. Some companies report that
100% of their profits came from AFUDC. Chandy & Davidson, AFUDC and its Im-
pact on the Profitability of Electric Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 4, 1983, at 28.
90. See Chandy & Davidson, supra note 89, at 36. "The capital markets, with or
without good reason, have come to regard 'real earnings' as more valuable than
AFUDC." Ex parte Gulf States Util. Co., 40 P.U.R. 4th 593, 597 (La. P.S.C. 1980).
Several other factors also account for investors' perceptions that high AFUDC firms are
riskier. Trout, supra note 86, at 23. First, AFUDC may not be compounded; hence the
overall return on AFUDC is lower. In addition, the allowed return on AFUDC is
lower. Finally, there is a risk that the commissions will reduce later high rates when the
plant goes on line. Id. at 26.
Bond ratings appear to correlate with the percentage of AFUDC. "Utilities with a
'double A' bond rating, for example, show AFUDC percentages of 33.5% as compares
with a 50.2% AFUDC component for companies with a 'BBB' bond rating."
Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 95. See also Chandy & Davidson, supra
note 89, at 35-36 (security analysts see AFUDC as significant risk factor; the industry
relies too heavily on AFUDC); Lerner & Breen, supra note 78 (statistics, charts, and
graphs showing the changes in AFUDC and subsequent effects on utilities and
shareholders).
91. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
92. Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 70. As of late 1980, 28 states
permitted utilities to pass along current construction costs to consumers. In some
states, the legislature mandated the pass-through of construction costs. In most states,
however, the public service commissions (PSCs) make a case-by-case determination,
based upon a company's financial need. Id. See also Muhs & Schauer, State Regulatory
Practices with Construction Work in Progress: A Summary, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 27,
1980, at 29 (gives a state-by-state summary of CWIP policies and practices between
1973 and 1977); Comment, supra note 21, at app. (source containing charts of each
state's regulatory practices). For debate on including CWIP in the FERC rate base, see
CWIP IN ELECTRIC BASE, supra note 26; CWIP in FERC, supra note 84.
93. Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 69.
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goes on line.94 CWIP recovery is premised on the theory that CWIP
will reduce future costs for facilities,95 thereby producing an overall
savings to ratepayers.
96
CWIP opponents, however, argue that this savings has not yet been
proven.97 Ratepayers, they argue, should pay only for costs associated
with facilities that actually provide service to them.98 The financial
markets, according to CWIP opponents, send relevant signals to utili-
ties.99 These messages, they contend, should not be ignored by placing
an involuntary investment risk on ratepayers that have no voice in the
utility's management." °° Improving market conditions 10 ' and alterna-
94. Iad
95. Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 29 (testimony of Matthew Holden).
[CWIP] in rate base has a two-fold benefit for the utility and its customers. The
total cost of projects is reduced because as the investment is included in the rate
base, interest charges against the portion so included cease. The reduced total cost
of the projects requires a smaller stream of... costs that ultimately redounds to
the benefit of consumers.
Comtois, Construction Work in Progress in the Rate Base: A Benefit to the Consumer,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 8, 1980, at 19-20.
96. See Johnson, Construction Work in Progress: Planning for the Rate Case, PuB.
UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2, 1979, at 18; Trout, supra note 86, at 25. One commentator argues
that because CWIP avoids certain costs associated with AFUDC, consumers almost
always will benefit under CWIP even if the current and expected future costs of capital
for consumers substantially exceed these costs for the utility. Johnson, supra, at 19.
These costs include property taxes, increasing tax rates, tax carry-forwards, and increas-
ing capital costs. Id at 17-18.
97. See CWIP in FERC, supra note 84, at 78. For a presentation of the arguments
against CWIP, see Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 106-42.
98. Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 120-29. Ratepayers argue that
abandoning the "used and useful" rule results in intergenerational inequities because
present and future customers are not necessarily the same group. Id. In addition, con-
sumers are forced to pay for projects that the utility never finishes. Id. at 129-34. Utili-
ties are tempted to "build and buy everything in sight," resulting in wasteful
management decisions. CWIP in FERC, supra note 84, at 18. Furthermore, a CWIP
policy is unlike the marketplace, where a business could not include the costs of financ-
ing new construction in current prices because the firm would price itself out of the
market. Id. at 86.
99. See CWIP in FERC, supra note 84, at 12.
100. Id at 91-92. "The ratepayer contribution is involuntary. It earns no re-
turn. . . .And he receives none of the other incidents of investment in a private corpo-
ration-he cannot sell or trade his interest, he has no say in management, he has no
claim on company assets." Id. at 92. With CWIP, the consumer bears the risk; with
AFUDC, the utility bears the risk. Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 169 (testimony
of Peter Navarro). Stockholders' say in management is probably more figurative than
real. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 26, at 263-64.
101. Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 111-15.
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tives to large plant construction programs, opponents claim, should
eliminate any need for CWIP.102
During a period of plant cancellations, CWIP indeed appears disad-
vantageous to consumers.1 3 CWIP proponents argue, however, that
consumers are ultimately harmed when investors bear the loss for can-
celled projects."° Furthermore, in the current capital climate, it ap-
pears fairly certain that consumers will benefit from CWIP.'0 5 CWIP
provides increased internal cash flow, 1" prevents dilution of equity
earnings, 107 and improves utility bond ratings.108 CWIP proponents
also dismiss the burden-benefit mismatch argument as wrong or at least
unimportant. " On balance, including CWIP in the rate base during
an acute capital crisis probably will put utilities in a better position to
provide economical, quality service to consumers.' 10
102. See CWIP in FERC, supra note 84, at 916. "[A] utility granted a return on
CWIP has no motiviation [sic] to share the risk of new construction with other utilities
through joint ventures or to pursue alternative strategies such as energy conservation,
load management, cogeneration or pooling arrangements." Id. See also infra notes 118-
19 (utilities exploring alternatives to large plant construction are financially healthy).
103. CWIP IN ELECTRIC BASE, supra note 26, at 9.
104. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text. See generally Hobelman,
Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 74-106 (pro-CWIP arguments).
105. See CWIP IN ELECTRIC BASE, supra note 26, at 21. In addition, CWIP will
help avoid the "capital attrition" problem that faces utilities when plants go on line.
Jones, supra note 20, at 879. When the plant comes on line, the AFUDC added to the
rate base appears to increase greatly the rate base, which causes a reduction in the rate
of return. Id. The result is a return thought to compensate the utility inadequately for
the construction costs. Id.
106 Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 75-83. CWIP also minimizes
overall capital costs. Id. at 94-99.
107. Id. at 85-88, 90-91.
108. Id. at 88-89.
109. See Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A
Report to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 15 TULSA L.J. 262, 271 (1979).
The significant issue is not whether CWIP is fair to those few customers who relo-
cate outside a given utility service area, but whether it is fair to the vast majority
who stay and to the utility, which must continue to operate and plan its system to
serve all its customers.
Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, supra note 68, at 105-06. This burden-benefit argument
against CWIP is absurd if one considers that no roads, municipal buildings, etc. would
be built if only those that would actually use them pay for them.
110. Johnson, supra note 96, at 17. Of course, this position requires close regula-
tory supervision to ensure that waste does not occur. It also requires a determination
whether a particular utility actually needs CWIP to ensure its financial integrity.
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B. Nuclear Power
In the early 1970s, electric utilities were optimistic about the
promises of nuclear energy. They anticipated that investments in nu-
clear plants would reduce generating costs, provide large quantities of
energy, eliminate atmospheric pollution, reduce needs for fuel transfer
and storage, and reduce dependence on limited fossil fuels through in-
creased reliance on abundant, inexpensive nuclear fuels." " Proponents
of nuclear power expected nuclear plants to produce over fifty percent
of the nation's power by the next century.112 Visions of economic and
technical gains, however, have faded rapidly." 3 The conditions crip-
pling many utilities have especially handicapped nuclear projects."14
Between 1972 and 1979, nuclear plant cancellations averaged eight per
year." 5 Since the Three Mile Island accident," 6 cancellations have
averaged over eleven per year."I7  Shortages of electricity may be
among the consequences of plant cancellations.'' 8
111. Larson, supra note 4, at 276-77.
112. Id at 277-78.
113. Huntington, supra note 24, at 694-95. Long delays in the planning, licensing,
and construction process are common. Id. at 695. New technical and safety require-
ments add significantly to the estimated costs of nuclear plants, and operating problems
have reduced the number of completed plants. Id.
114. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. In addition to reduced power
needs and high capital costs, licensing delays, interest group opposition, and state oppo-
sition to plant siting and waste management has slowed and stopped construction of
nuclear projects. ELECTRIC POWER: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE, supra note 76, at 35.
High interest rates and high construction costs especially affect lengthy nuclear projects.
Larson, supra note 4, at 282-83. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1090, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) (elements of nuclear costs; costs of alternate power sources).
115. See Kester, supra note 7, at Bl, col. 5-6.
116. See ENERGY POLICY, supra note 5, at 84-88. See also Brooks & D'Souza, Elec-
tric Utility Returns and Risk in the Light of Three Mile Island, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Nov.
11, 1982, at 26 ("investors associate a decline in future profitability or increased risk
with nuclear-associated utilities"); Financial Fallout from Three Mile Island: Hearings
on H.R. 2512 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (debate over supplemen.
tal insurance for remedial action); Financing the Cleanup of the Three Mile Island Nu-
clear Powerplant: Joint Hearing on S. 1606 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources and the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on
Envir. and Public Works, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (bill to require plant licensees to
contribute to cleanup).
117. See Kester, supra note 7, at B1, col. 5-6.
118. See DIVISION OF POWER SUPPLY AND RELIABILITY, EcON. REGULATORY
ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR THE
CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES 1980-1989, § 1.1-3 (1980). Nuclear plant delays and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/9
CANCELLATION COST RECOVERY
Plant cancellations also have damaged many utilities' positions in
capital markets.'" 9 While PUCs find that nearly every cancellation de-
cision is prudent"' ° and nearly always permit recovery of the invest-
ment through rate increases, 121 analysts consider utilities heavily
involved in failed nuclear projects investment risks.' 22 Electric utilities
that shunned the appeal of nuclear power and pursued conservation
and alternative supply arrangements may be among the most stable
utilities today."'z In sum, the capital crisis of the last two decades has
especially affected utilities struggling with the losses from nuclear plant
cancellations. It is against these industry conditions that PUC rate or-
ders should be viewed when considering utility claims of confiscation.
III. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CANCELLATION COST RECOVERY
Most states allow utilities to recover the loss on investments in can-
celled plants by amortizing the loss over a period of years, without
including the unamortized balance in the rate base.' Other states
permit both a return of, and a return on, the investment by including
the unamortized portion of cancellation expenses in the rate base. 125
cancellations will result in the consumption of large quantities of fossil fuel. Id. at 3.
See generally id. at § VII.9 (detailed regional analysis of the delays in issuing licenses).
119. Brooks & D'Souza, supra note 116, at 26.
120. See infra notes 128-34 (examples of cancellation cases holding that the nuclear
decision was prudent). It is assumed, for discussion, that these findings of prudence are
accurate. It is clear, however, that at least some of the risks were apparent long before
many utilities became cautious. See, e.g., Bloch, Nuclear Power Plant Proliferation, 2
ENVTL. L. 376, 376-81 (1972); R. NADER & J. ABBOTrs, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC
ENERGY 212, 216-263 (1977). See generally Allison, supra note 109 (detailed discussion
on whether nuclear plants are prudent investments).
121. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Leckey, Good Buys in Electric Utilities, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar.
2, 1984, at 14A, col. 1. But see Brooks & D'Souza, supra note 116, at 31.
123. See Utility Financing, supra note 65, at 57 (testimony of John Bryson). See
generally id. (discusses whether future power needs can be met by conservation,
cogeneration, load management techniques, and diversification of utilities); Huntington,
supra note 24, at 695 (alternatives to extensive utility investment); Thompson, The Stra-
tegic Dilemma of Electric Utilities-Part II, PUB. UTIL. FoRT., Apr. 1, 1982, at 21
(advocates slow growth strategy and greater utilization of existing capacity); Woychik,
supra note 25, at 442-43 (states must reduce need and incentive for nuclear power);
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 59 (surveys "least cost" methods to reduce capacity
requirements).
124, See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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The few cases denying cost recovery have cited either imprudence 26 or
statutory prohibitions against cost recovery 127 to support the denial of
cost recovery.
A. Cost Recovery Permitted
Most state PUCs, as well as FERC, permit electric utilities to re-
cover the amounts invested in a cancelled project but prohibit any re-
turn on the investment. 128 This is accomplished by amortizing the loss
126. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
128. See In re Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., No. U-1345 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1976) (five
year amortization of Kaiparowitz costs); Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 P.U.R. 4th 109
(N.J. Bd. P.U. 1983) (amortization of Hope Creek II costs); Re Bunger Hydro-Elec.
Co., 46 P.U.R. 4th 503 (Me. P.U.C. 1982) (amortization amount excluded AFUDC);
Re Central Me. Power Co., No. 80-25 (Me. P.U.C. 1980) (five year amortization for
Sears Island plant; AFUDC excluded from costs), ajffd, Central Me. Power Co. v. Pub-
lic Util. Comm'n, 433 A.2d 331 (Me. 1981); Re Central Me. Power Co., Nos. 81-127
and 81-206 (Me. P.U.C. 1982) (permitted amortization of Montague plant costs); Re
Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., Nos. 4496 and 4504 (Vt. P.S. Bd. 1981) (five year amorti-
zation of Montague costs); Re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 49 P.U.R. 4th 372 (Vt. P.S.
Bd. 1982) (10 year amortization of Pilgrim II costs); Re Commonwealth Elec. Co., 47
P.U.R. 4th 229 (Mass. D.P.U. 1982) (three year amortization, excluding equity
AFUDC, on Montague I and II; two year amortization on prudent Pilgrim II ex-
penses-those incurred prior to July 1980); Re Connecticut Light & Power Co., Nos.
810602 and 810604 (Conn. D.P.U. 1981) (amortization excluding imprudent expenses);
Re Consumers Power Co., 14 P.U.R. 4th 370, adopting Order F-700 (Mich. P.S.C.
1975) (10 year amortization of Quanicassee plant); Re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R.
4th 318 (Mich. P.S.C. 1983) (10 year amortization of Greenwood II and III; rate base
decision deferred); Re Duke Power, 49 P.U.R. 4th 483 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982) (five
year amortization of Perkins costs); Re Duke Power Co., No. 82-50E (S.C. P.S.C. 1983)
(10 year amortization of Perkins and Cherokee II and III plants); Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 644, aftg, 51 P.U.R. 4th 198 (Pa.
P.U.C. 1983) (upheld amortization of Davis Besse III and IV, Erie I and II plants); Re
Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 197 (Mass. D.P.U. 1983) (permitted
amortization of all Fitchburg costs; amortization only if prudent-up to July 1980-
Pilgrim II costs; disallow equity portion of AFUDC); Re Gulf Power Co., 43 P.U.R.
4th 15 (Fla. P.S.C. 1981) (five year amortization of Caryville costs), affid, Gulf Power
Co. v. Cresse, 410 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1982); Re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 P.U.R.
4th 157 (Tex. P.U.C. 1982) (10 year amortization excluding imprudent costs-Jan.
1980 to Aug. 1982--of Creek I plant); Houston Lighting & Power Co., No. 2001 (Tex.
P.U.C. 1978) (amortization of Creek II plant); Re Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., Nos.
RPU-80-19 and 80-29 (Iowa S.C.C. 1981) (recognizing stipulation to five year amortiza-
tion for Quad Cities Station); Re Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 44 P.U.R. 4th 54
(N.J. Bd. P.U. 1981) (15 year amortization of Forked River costs); Re Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co., No. 36689 (Ind. P.S.C. 1982) (15 year amortization of Bailly costs;
statute forbids rate base treatment); Re Northern States Power Co., 46 P.U.R. 4th 110
(FERC 1981) (five year amortization of Tyrone costs), affid sub nom. South Dakota
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over a period of years' 29 without placing the balance in the rate base,
thereby allowing a return of, but not on, the investment.1 30  In this
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982); Re Northern States Power
Co., No. 10, 233 (N.D. P.S.C. 1982) (10 year amortization permitted because FERC
approval preempted North Dakota's original denial of Tyrone costs); Re Northern
States Power Co., No. F-3422 (S.D. P.U.C. 1983) (amortization of Tyrone costs); Re
Northern States Power Co., No. CA-5447 (Wis. P.S.C. 1981) (five year amortization of
Tyrone costs); Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1981), rev'g
No. 10,017 (N.D. P.S.C. 1980) (where FERC permitted amortization of Tyrone ex-
penses, the PUC must do likewise); Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 29 P.U.R. 4th 517
(D.C. P.S.C. 1979) (10 year amortization of Douglas Point costs); Re Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., No. 794-310 (N.J. Bd. P.U. 1980) (20 year amortization of Atlantic costs);
Re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., No. 8012-914 (N.J. Bd. P.U. 1982) (15 year amortiza-
tion of Hope Creek II costs); Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound
Power & Light Co., No. U-82-38 (Wash. P.S.D. 1983) (10 year amortization of Pebble
Spnngs WPPSS V costs); Re San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 31 P.U.R. 4th 435 (Ca. P.U.C.
1979) (five year amortization of Sundesert costs); Re San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., No.
87639 (Cal. P.U.C. 1977) (five year amortization of Kaiparowits costs); Re Southern
Cal. Edison Co., No. 89711 (Cal. P.U.C. 1978) (five year amortization of Kaiparowits
costs); Re Union Elec. Co., No. ER-77-154 (Mo. P.S.C. 1978) (five year amortization of
Rush Island III and IV costs); In re Union Elec. Co., No. U-558 (Iowa C.C. 1975)
(amortize Rush Island III and IV costs during life of oil plant); Re Union Elec. Co., No.
82-0525 (I11. C.C. 1983) (five year amortization of Callaway II costs); Union Elec. Co. v.
FERC, 668 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1981) (permitted amortization of Callaway II costs); Re
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 44 P.U.R. 4th 46 (Va. St. C.C. 1981) (amortization of
North Anna IV costs); Re Virginia Elec. Power Co., 29 P.U.R. 4th 65 (Va. St. C.C.
1979) (10 year amortization of Surry III and IV costs); Re Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.,
No. 05-CE-3 (Wis. P.S.C. 1980) (three year amortization of Haven costs); Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co. v. Wisconsin P.S.C., No. 79-1929 (Wis. 1982) (reversed cost denied for
Koshkonong plant). Joint Appendix, Missouri ex rel Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, Case No. CV 183-1064cc (cites cases listed supra).
See also Bruder, Recovery of Losses on Cancelled Projects: Basic Issues 167, 185-87 in
ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 68 (abandonment loss cases); Sommers, Recovery of Elec-
tric Utility Losses from Abandoned Construction Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
363, 371 n.43 (1982) (abandonment loss cases); Wilson, Ratemaking Treatment of
Abandoned Generating Plant Losses, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 343, 352-58 (1982)
(summary of state cancellation proceedings); id. at 345-52 (summary of FERC cancella-
tions); id. at 349-52 (Minnesota's resolution of Tyrone case discussed); Comment, Allo-
cation of the Risk of Constructing Electric Power Plants, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 517
(criticizes decision to permit cost recovery in a Michigan decision).
129. Without rate base treatment, the length of the amortization period is signifi-
cant; "the longer the amortization period, the fewer current dollars ratepayers have to
pay." Re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 49 P.U.R. 4th 372, 392 (Vt. P.S. Bd. 1982).
130. Because an electric utility may not earn returns higher than those necessary
"to attract capital and provide service at reasonable rates," it lacks financial resources
to absorb the loss of the investment. Re Public Serv. Co. of Okla., No. 27068, Order
206560. 57 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n 1982). A utility exchanges the obligation to serve
franchised areas for monopoly status-not a guaranteed return on investments. Wash-
ington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., No. U-82-38, 20
19851
Washington University Open Scholarship
366 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 28:345
manner, investors and ratepayers share the burden of cancellation
costs. In many cases, a PUC may hold that utilities cannot recover
certain cost components or require that losses be offset by any resulting
savings. 131
A minority of state PUCs permit both recovery of the funds invested
in abandoned plants and a return on the investment. 132 The unamor-
tized balance is included in the rate base, like a plant in service, and
each year the utility recovers a portion of that amount through operat-
ing expenses, like depreciation. 133 These PUCs generally permit recov-
ery on the theory that prudently invested funds are "used and useful"
and, therefore, appropriate for inclusion in the rate base.134 This ra-
tionale assumes that if an investment is prudent, it is also used and
useful. Commissions permitting recovery without rate base treatment
(Wash. P.S.D. 1983). "It is illogical to allow shareholders to earn a return based on the
riskiness of their investment, and, at the same time, insulate them from risk by allowing
them a return on all substantial recovered expense items." Re Connecticut Light &
Power Co., Nos. 810602 and 810604, 42 (Conn. D.P.U. 1981). This method of cost
recovery is considered an equitable sharing of losses between ratepayers and investors.
Puget Sound Power, No. U-82-38, at 20.
131. See, e.g., Bruder, supra note 128, at 177-81 (description of net-of-tax and gross-
of-tax amortization).
132. Re Boston Edison Co., 53 P.U.R. 4th 349 (Mass. D.P.U. 1983), modifying 46
P.U.R. 4th 431 (Mass. D.P.U. 1982) (recovery of Pilgrim II costs); Re Carolina Power
& Light Co., 49 P.U.R. 4th 188 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982) (only costs supported by
long-term debt permitted in rate base; Harris III and IV plants); Re Carolina Power &
Light Co., No. 81-163E (S.C. P.S.C. 1982) (10 year amortization of South River costs);
Re Gulf Power Co., 43 P.U.R. 4th 15 (Fla. P.S.C. 1981) (five year amortization of
Caryville costs); Re Lake Superior Dist. Power Co., No. CA-5447 (Wis. P.S.C. 1981)
(five year amortization of Tyrone costs); Re Long Island Lighting Co., No. 27811
(A.L.J. 1981) (amortization of New Haven costs); Re New York State Elec. & Gas
Corp., Nos. 26432 and 26433 (N.Y. P.S.C. 1974) (amortization of Bell costs); Re North-
ern States Power Co., F-3422 (S.D. P.U.C. 1983) (20 year amortization for Tyrone
costs; rate base treatment for debt but not equity); Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50
P.U.R. 4th 500 (D.C. P.S.C. 1982) (amortization of Dickerson costs); Re Public Serv.
Co. of Okla., No. 27068, Order 206560 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n 1982) (amortization of
Black Fox costs; return on debt, but not on equity); Re Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp.,
45 P.U.R. 4th 386 (N.Y. P.S.C. 1982) (amortization of Sterling costs; Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., three years; Central Hudson Gas & Elec., five years; Orange & Rockland
Utilities, Inc., 10 years; Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., five years); Re Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 48 P.U.R. 4th 327 (N.C. Util. Co. 1982) (10 year amortization of North
Anna IV costs). See Joint Appendix, Missouri ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, CV 183-1064cc.
133. Re Gulf Power Co., 43 P.U.R. 4th 15, 17 (Fla. P.S.C. 1981).
134. Re Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 P.U.R. 4th 188 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982);
Sommers, supra note 128, at 374-77.
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acknowledge the prudent investment, but refuse to label the investment
"used and useful."
B. Cost Recovery Denied
A few state utility commissions have denied cancellation cost recov-
ery, some by use of the imprudence rationale, others by perceived stat-
utory mandate. In Arizona, the state commission prohibited cost
recovery for Palo Verde IV and V because: 1) the Public Service Com-
pany (PSC) presented insufficient evidence to justify the expense; 2) the
expense was unusual and nonrecurring; 3) ratepayers should not be
responsible for mistakes in shareholder management decisions; and
4) the cancellation decision resulted largely from adverse regulatory
conditions in California, which the utility should have anticipated. 135
Similarly, the Maine PUC prohibited Central Maine Power's recovery
of Pilgrim II costs because of imprudence. 136 The Minnesota PUC
reached a similar finding, thereby thwarting Northern States Power's
effort to recover costs of the Tyrone plant.137 While these decisions
turn primarily on the issue of prudence, another line of cost denial
cases turn on whether state law permits cost recovery.
While some efforts to defeat recovery by reliance on state statutes
have been unsuccessful,138 a few state PUCs have found sufficient stat-
135. Re Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 P.U.R. 4th 547, 555-56 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n
1980).
136. Re Central Me. Power Co., Nos. 81-127 and 81-206, 30 (Me. P.U.C. 1982).
137. Re Northern States Power Co., 42 P.U.R. 4th 339, 362 (Minn. P.U.C. 1981).
The Commission found that abandonment expenses were not a "reasonable expense,"
and refused to make ratepayers "insulate the owners from financial risk." Id. See also
Re Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, 78-30, and 80-36 (Iowa S.C.C. 1981)
(recovery prohibited at the time because utility failed to show costs were not offset by
the value of the land).
138. Generally, these statutes are anti-CWIP statutes that have a limited scope of
authority to deny recovery. In Re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 318 (Mich. P.S.C.
1983), the PSC found that "provisions of the Michigan Electric Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 460.551 (1979), did not prohibit cost recovery." Id at 322.
An appeal to statutory authority also failed in Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Duquesne Light Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 644 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983). At issue was 66 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1315 (1979), which provides, in part:
[Tihe cost of construction or expansion of a facility undertaken by a public utility
producing, generating, transmitting, distributing, or furnishing electricity shall not
be made a part of the rate base nor otherwise included in the rates charged by the
electric utility until such time as the facility is used and useful in service to the
public. [E]xcept as stated in this section, no electric utility property shall be
deemed used and useful until it is presently providing actual utility service to the
customers.
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utory authority to deny recovery. In 1981 the Ohio Supreme Court
held, in Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission,139 that cost
recovery denial was mandated statutorily. The court ruled that, irre-
spective of the utility's duty to render service, 140 the question under the
statute is whether the cancelled plant was a "cost to the utility of ren-
dering the public utility service for the test period."14' According to
the Ohio Supreme Court, it was not. The statute, it declared, excluded
unusual, nonrecurring expenses from the rate calculation.142 There-
fore, the PUC exceeded its authority when it permitted cancellation
cost recovery. 143 The court recognized the "gloomy" position of the
utility in the capital markets, but noted that the legislature, unlike the
PUC or the courts, retained the power to change the law.
144
The day after the Consumers' Counsel decision, Cleveland Electric's
bond rating dropped.' 45 In 1983 the Ohio PUC raised the utility's rate
of return, partly to compensate for investors' perception of investment
risk.146 The Ohio Supreme Court held that the PUC may raise the rate
of return based on the increase in perceived risk to investors resulting
from the decision in Consumers' Counsel."47 The dissent charged that
the majority had condoned what Consumers' Counsel condemned, 148
and noted that the court had circumvented its 1981 decision.
149
Id. The court found that the intent of the disjunctive language "is merely designed to
prohibit both the inclusion of construction work in progress in rate base and any alter-
native rate-making action, which would accomplish the same or similar result." Id. at
650.
139. 67 Ohio St. 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981).
140. Id. at 163, 423 N.E.2d at 826.
141. Id. at 163-64, 423 N.E.2d at 827.
142. Id. at 164, 423 N.E.2d at 827.
143. Id. at 166, 423 N.E.2d at 828.
144. Id. at 167, 423 N.E.2d at 828-29.
145. Bruder, supra note 128, at 172.
146. See Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 107, 109,
447 N.E.2d 746, 748 (1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 47 (1984).
147. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 111, 115, 447
N.E.2d 749, 753-54 (1983).
148. Id. at 116, 447 N.E.2d at 754 (Lochner, J., dissenting).
149. Id at 117, 447 N.E.2d at 755 (Lochner, J., dissenting).
We should have summarily reversed because the PUCO's holding as to investor
CEI is resjudicata. That is, CEI stands for the proposition that ratepayers are not
to pay for these cancelled nuclear plants. This rule should apply whether the
mechanism used to subvert the "used and useful" principle is called "amortiza-
tion" or anything else.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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A statutory prohibition against granting cost recovery similarly re-
stricts the Oregon PUC.'5' Oregon's Ballot Measure Nine excludes all
costs of ventures that never reach fruition.' 5 ' Likewise, the Montana
PSC denied cancellation cost recovery to Pacific Power & Light'
based on the "actually used and useful" language in a Montana stat-
ute. '53 The PSC explained that prudence was not at issue when a stat-
utory prohibition applied,'54 and noted that the utility's quid pro quo
for its obligation to serve was monopoly status, not risk-free
investments.155
Missouri recently seized on a statutory basis for cost recovery de-
nial.'5 6 The Missouri PSC denied Union Electric Company recovery
of costs for the Callaway II nuclear power plant' 57 on the authority of
Proposition One,' which prohibits charges for any property "before it
is fully operational and used for service."' 59 The Missouri Circuit
150. Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 49 P.U.R. 4th 82 (Or. P.U.C. 1982). See also
Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 49 P.U.R. 4th 274 (Or. P.U.C. 1982) (forbidding rate in-
crease to compensate for plant cancellation); Washington Utils. & Trans. Comm'n v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 148 (Wash. U.T.C. 1983) (permitting in-
creased rate of return for investors' perception of risk from Oregon statute). But cf Re
Portland Gen. Elec. Co., No. 79-055 (Or. P.U.C. 1979) (statute only prohibited rate
base treatment for dam cancellation costs).
151. 49 P.U.R. 4th at 91. The measure provides that a utility may not charge rates
derived from a rate base that includes costs of future improvements. OR. Rlv. STAT.
§ 757.355 (1982).
152. Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 53 P.U.R. 4th 24 (Mont. P.S.C. 1983).
153. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-109 (1983). The Montana statute is especially
weak support for denying cost recovery:
The commission may, in its discretion, investigate and ascertain the value of the
property of every public utility actually used and useful for the convenience of the
public. The commission is not bound to accept or use any particular value in deter-
mining rates; provided, that if any value is used, such value may not exceed the
original cost of the property.
Id.
154. 53 P.U.R. 4th at 28.
155. Id. at 28-29.
156. See Re Union Elec. Co., No. ER-83-163 (Mo. P.S.C. 1983). See also Buckeley,
P.S. New Hampshire Can't Bill Customers for Costs of Unfinished Plants, Court Says,
Wall St. J., June 13, 1984, at 8, col. 2.
157. Order of the Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. ER-83-163 (Oct. 21, 1983).
158. Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.135 (1978).
159. Id. The full text of the statutes reads:
Any charge made or demanded by an electrical corporation for service, or in con-
nection therewith, which is based on the costs of construction in progress upon any
existing or new facility of the electrical corporation, or any other cost associated
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Court affirmed the PSC's decision, 160 and the case is currently pending
before the Missouri Supreme Court.1 6 1 The Missouri Supreme Court
must determine whether Proposition One applies to plant cancellations
and, if so, whether the result is confiscatory. The next section analyzes
these issues, as well as the resulting effect on consumers.
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATUTES AFFECTING COST RECOVERY
A. Statutes Prohibiting Cost Recovery
1. Applicability of Statutory Language to Plant Cancellations
Courts in Pennsylvania and Michigan have refused to read cost re-
covery prohibitions into their respective anti-CWIP and rate base cal-
culation statutes.162 The Pennsylvania statute prohibits rate base
treatment of CWIP costs until the facility is "presently providing ac-
tual utility service to customers." '163 It also prohibits inclusion of con-
struction or expansion costs in the rate base."6 The Pennsylvania
PUC declined to stretch this language to prohibit cancellation cost re-
covery.' 65 The PUC held that the statute is merely a thorough anti-
CWIP provision that does not prohibit ultimate cost recovery.'
66
with owning, operating, maintaining, or financing any property before it is fully
operational and used for service, is unjust and unreasonable, and is prohibited.
Id.
160. Order of the Mo. Cir. Ct. of Cole County, Case No. CV 183-1064cc (Apr. 16,
1984).
161. Notice of Appeal to the Sup. Ct. of Mo., CV 183-1064cc (Apr. 16, 1984).
162. In re Duquesne Light Co., 42 P.U.R. 4th 644 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983); In re Detroit
Edison Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 318 (Mich. P.S.C. 1983).
163. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1315 (Supp. 1982). The statute provides:
Except for such nonrevenue producing, nonexpense reducing investments as may
be reasonably shown to be necessary to improve environmental conditions at ex-
isting facilities or improve safety at existing facilities or as may be required to con-
vert facilities to the utilization of coal, the cost of construction or expansion of a
facility undertaken by a public utility producing, generating, transmitting, distrib-
uting or furnishing electricity shall not be made a part of the rate base nor other-
wise included in the rates charged by the electric utility until such time as the
facility is used and useful in service to the public. Except as stated in this section,
no electric utility property shall be deemed used and useful until it is presently
providing actual utility service to the customers.
Id.
164. Id.
165. 52 P.U.R. 4th at 649-50.
166. Id. at 650.
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Michigan's statute is significantly different from the Ohio statutes' 67
and more general than Pennsylvania's statute. In Michigan, the com-
mission has the discretion to consider "all lawful elements" when fixing
utility rates. 16' As in Pennsylvania, attempts to find a prohibition
against cancellation cost recovery in the Michigan statutory language
have been unsuccessful. 169
Although Oregon's statute171 is similar to the Pennsylvania and
Michigan statutes, 17 1 the Oregon PUC held that the statute prohibits
cancellation cost recovery.' 72 Like the Pennsylvania statute, 173 Ore-
gon's statute merely prohibits basing rates on a rate base that includes
property "not presently used for providing utility service to the con-
sumer." 174 At best it appears that this statute is an anti-CWIP provi-
sion that may prohibit inclusion of unamortized cancellation recovery
balances in the rate base. The statute does not, however, address can-
cellation cost recovery.
Similarly, the Montana PUC has found a cost recovery prohibition
in language' 75 that resembles Michigan's statute. 176 The "used and
useful" language relied on by the Montana Commission to preclude
Pacific Power & Light's recovery of cancellation costs 177 is set in the
context of rate base valuation language, which prohibits setting rate
base values that "exceed the original cost.' 171 Montana's statute con-
tains neither anti-CWIP language nor language prohibiting cancella-
tion cost recovery. Thus, Oregon and Montana have gone beyond the
167. Id. at 322.
168. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.551 (1979).
169. See 52 P.U.R. 4th at 322.
170. 1980 Or. Laws 757.355. The statutes provides:
No public utility shall, directly or indirectly, by any device, charge, demand, col-
lect or receive from any customer rates which are derived from a rate base which
includes within it any construction, building, installation or real or personal prop-
erty not presently used for providing utility service to the customer.
Id.
171. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1315 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.551
(1979). See supra notes 163, 168 and accompanying text.
172. See 49 P.U.R. 4th at 90-91. See also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
173. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1315 (Supp. 1982).
174. 1980 Or. Laws 757.355.
175. MONT. CODE ANN. § 63-3-103 (1983).
176. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
177. 53 P.U.R. 5th at 27-29.
178. See supra note 175.
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plain meaning of their respective statutes and have ignored their con-
text by prohibiting cost recovery.
This appears to be the case in Missouri as well, where the PSC and a
lower court have concluded that Proposition One 179 bars cost recov-
ery.180 The "or any other cost"'18 language in Proposition One must
be read in conjunction with the preceding language that refers to all
elements of CWIP costs. The essence of Proposition One is that the
utility is prohibited from making any CWIP charge before the invest-
ment is fully operational. It is not evident that this voter initiative an-
ticipated unfinished projects. This may mean, as Union Electric is
arguing, that the statute governs only the timing of cost recovery.
182
While the PSC and intervenors present excellent arguments demon-
strating that the "before" clause contemplates no recovery "until" the
plant is operational, 8 ' Proposition One probably is only an anti-
CWIP statute. Pennsylvania, which has the "until" language in its
statute, declined to accept similar arguments."8 4 If the Missouri
Supreme Court concludes that Proposition One merely is an anti-
CWIP statute, it not only will follow the apparent purpose of the stat-
ute, but also will avoid the constitutional question.
2. Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting Cost Recovery
In Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, s the
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's statutory
ban on cost recovery, as interpreted in Consumers' Counsel.'86 The
court held that cost recovery denial is constitutional, even when the
utility prudently incurred these costs, if the rate order in its entirety is
just and the end result is not confiscatory.' 8 7 Relying on the "used and
179. Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.135 (1978).
180. Order of the Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. ER-83-163 (Oct. 21, 1983);
Order of the Mo. Cir. Ct. of Cole County, Case No. CV 183-1064cc (Apr. 16, 1984).
181. See supra note 179.
182. Brief of Relator, Case No. CV 183-1064cc, at 5-6.
183. Brief of Respondent Public Serv. Comm'n, at 2-4; Brief of Respondent-Inter-
venor MoPIRG, at 2-9; Brief of Respondent-Intervenor Office of the Public Counsel, at
1-4.
184. 52 P.U.R. 4th at 649-50.
185. 4 Ohio St. 3d 91, 447 N.E.2d 733 (1983). See also Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746, appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct.
47 (1983) (similar constitutional attack repelled by authority of the Dayton case).
186. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
187. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 105-06, 447 N.E.2d at 742-43, 745.
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useful" language and "zone of reasonableness" concepts,"'8 the court
reasoned that prudent investments that never provide service could be
constitutionally excluded from the rate calculation.'
8 9
The arguments in the Missouri appeal are similar to those in the
Ohio case. While Union Electric argues that prudently-incurred costs
should be recovered as operating expenses,' 90 the respondents contend
that prudence is not an issue when a statute flatly prohibits recovery of
costs for abandoned projects.' 9 ' To show that the statute results in a
taking, Union Electric must prove that confiscatory results flow from
the rate order. The utility must emphasize the elements of the Hope-
Bluefield test that require the utility to present compelling evidence
that the rate order will destroy the utility's financial soundness and
prevent the utility from attracting the capital necessary to ensure safe
and reliable service to its customers.192 Union Electric should present
solid statistics illustrating the utility's current and probable post-order
financial condition.' 93 The utility would do well to analogize its condi-
tion to that of severely crippled utilities in other jurisdictions. Union
Electric neglected, however, to build such a factual record before the
PSC, and failed in its brief to allege any facts to establish a prima facie
taking.'94 A court cannot find the "end result" of a rate order confis-
catory if the complaining party cannot allege facts that prove confisca-
tory results.' 95 While the policy decision to deny cancellation cost
recovery probably is unwise, it is not unconstitutional-unless the "to-
tal effect"' 9 6 of a PUC's rate order fails to provide a return sufficient to
satisfy the Bluefield criteria.' 97
188. Id. at 97-99, 447 N.E.2d at 738-40. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying
text.
189. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 105-06, 447 N.E.2d at 744-45.
190. Brief of Relator, No. CV 183-1064cc, at 5-8.
191. Brief of Respondent-Intervenor MoPIRG, at 12.
192. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
193. A utility cannot prove confiscation by merely citing cases and concluding that
the rate is confiscatory. It must present data demonstrating the state of the electric
industry, effects of similar decisions on other utilities, and the probable consequences, in
market terms, of the rate order. The utility should also show that the rate order will
negatively affect the utility's ability to ensure sufficient power supplies to meet future
needs, as well as its ability to keep costs of service low.
194. Brief of Relator, No. C-V-183-1064cc, at 18-19.
195. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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A statute that prohibits cancellation cost recovery is insulated effec-
tively from constitutional attack, provided the regulatory commission
has the latitude to set a rate that meets Hope-Bluefield standards.
Therefore, if the utility properly prepares evidence proving confisca-
tion,19 the "end result" analysis would not compel a finding that the
statute was unconstitutional. It simply would mean that the rate order
was unconstitutional and that the PUC must make some alteration to
produce a just and reasonable rate. 99 As in Ohio, 2" the effect of a
cost recovery prohibition on a rate proceeding is merely to prevent can-
celled plant costs from appearing in the rate base or as operating ex-
penses; yet these costs may be reflected ultimately in an increased rate
of return.
B. The Public Interest and Statutes Prohibiting Cost Recovery
Although cost recovery bans are constitutional, nevertheless, they
may harm both utilities and consumers. The cost recovery problem is
similar to the CWIP/AFUDC debate.20' Given present financial con-
ditions,2°2 it appears that, in the long run, prohibiting cost recovery
ultimately will not benefit anyone.2 °3 Utilities associated with failed
nuclear projects, like those with large ratios of AFUDC to net in-
come,20 struggle in the capital markets.2"5 The utility ultimately faces
higher costs for capital. 2 6 Higher capital costs will force PUCs, like
the Ohio PUC,207 to give relief via increased rates of return to compen-
sate utilities for the effects of denying recovery through operating
expenses.
If utilities can recover profits resulting from highly successful yen-
198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. The adjustment likely would be an increased rate of return. See Robinson,
supra note 85, at 22. For a critique of confiscation tests and suggestions for modern
tests, see Hanson & Davies, supra note 22, at 529, 537-40.
200. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
203. See Foster, supra note 74, at 934; SiUllen, supra note 69, at 18; Bouknight. Bal-
ancing Risks and Rewards to Reduce Financial Disincentives to Power Plant Construc-
tion, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 12, 1981, at 21.
204. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
206. See Central Vermont, 49 P.U.R. 4th at 392; Foster, supra note 74, at 891;
Robinson, supra note 85, at 19.
207. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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tures, PUCs should require them to bear the burden of huge losses on
prudent investments.20" But regulation limits utility windfalls.20 9
Therefore, it is inconsistent to contend that regulation should not limit
the impact of extraordinary losses. The competitive market conse-
quence of going out of business is not realistic for electric utilities.210
V. RESPONDING TO AND PREVENTING MISTAKES
While it is not the purpose of this Note to evaluate the decisions to
build, and cancel, the nuclear plants that have raised the issues dis-
cussed previously, a few suggestions for future decision-making are ap-
propriate. During the 1960s and early 1970s, when the government
encouraged the electric industry to pursue nuclear energy, evidence al-
ready was available indicating that the nuclear path would become lit-
tered with peril.21 ' What occurred, nevertheless, was a recklessly rapid
commitment by many utilities to an insufficiently explored power
source to the exclusion of other viable energy alternatives.2 12
When balancing today's power demands with the need to ensure sen-
sible, future power source choices, utilities must carefully consider con-
sequences involved.213 Government policies and regulatory practices
that discourage careful decision-making or provide disincentives for
conservation and source diversification must be avoided. Similarly,
regulatory disincentives for careful utility management must turn into
incentives.21 4 These changes will result in more realistic power need
208. See Bouknight, supra note 203, at 22.
209. See Re Public Service Co. of Okla., Case No. 27068, Order No. 206560 at 57
(Okla. Corp. Comm'n 1982).
210. Robinson, supra note 85, at 20.
211. See supra note 120.
212. See, e.g., Note, Full Electric Utility Ownership of PURPA Qualifying Cogener-
ators Trouble Down the Line?, 27 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 321 (1984) (dis-
cusses utility ownership of cogeneration facilities).
213. It is difficult to believe, for example, that utilities made huge commitments to
nuclear generating plant development without a careful analysis of the nuclear waste
problem. This is a significant problem, given that nuclear waste will affect hundreds of
generations. To assume that a proven solution would develop after the waste is pro-
duced is a serious abdication of planning responsibility.
Of course, this planning problem is not limited to nuclear power. What, for example,
are the effects of encouraging increased use of woodburning stoves? Air pollution, in-
creased timber demand, unit safety, and convenience are but a few relevant
considerations.
214. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 506-07, 556-58.
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forecasts.215
Each state also must reevaluate the role of its PUC. Commissions
and their staffs should become more technically adept and involved in
careful evaluation of long-range utility planning. Alternatively, states
should restructure their regulatory scheme to provide for efficient and
effective planning by utilities. Interjurisdictional planning, as sug-
gested by some commentators, 216 will become a more important factor
in efforts to meet power and safety needs, and should be incorporated
into modem planning schemes.
Objections to CWIP may wane if states develop incentives for better
utility planning and management and improved regulatory supervision.
Careffilly-monitored CWIP provisions may become essential to avoid
the effects of huge AFUDC accumulations. The effect of AFUDC on
the utility and its investors is troublesome,21 7 like the impact on con-
sumers' utility bills when a new plant goes on line. The current climate
demands experimentation with carefully supervised CWIP provisions.
Current ratepayers, who have benefited from historically reasonable
utility rates, should expect to bear part of the burden of bringing in
new energy technologies to meet future power needs. The ratepayers
also have a right to expect that electric utilities will develop only safe
and efficient energy sources, and that the utilities will give careful
thought to the future generations that must live with the consequences
of today's decisions.
In retrospect, cancelled plants exist, and so do huge rate increases
when finished plants go on line. Efforts to avoid rate shock in cases
when there was no CWIP recovery during construction should focus
not only on phasing in rate increases, but also on ensuring that total
recovery by the utility provides due compensation.218 A partial CWIP
allowance, as Illinois has done,21 9 might best diminish the rate shock
problem.
The most stunning rate shock is, of course, paying a high utility bill
215. Id. at 509-10.
216. See, e.g., id. at 544-56.
217. See supra notes 88-90, 106-08.
218. For an example of an equitable plan, see Nellie, Allocating Nuclear Power Costs
Over Time, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 29, 1982, at 22. These plans will, of course, gener-
ate controversy. See, eg., Ganey, Electricity 'Rate Shock Bill' is Illegal, PSC Staff Says,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 26, 1984 at 4A, col. 3.
219. See Re Commonwealth Edison Co., 50 P.U.R. 4th 221 (Il1. C.C. 1982). The
Commission permitted the utility to recover part of its construction work in progress,
stating that both current and future ratepayers ultimately would benefit. Id. at 236.
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for a plant that provides no service. When the decisions to build and
cancel are prudent, both ratepayers and investors must bear the burden
of paying for abandoned plants. This shock hopefully will jolt utilities,
investors, consumer groups, and the government into a reasoned dis-
cussion of the best way to meet energy needs without making economi-
cally, socially, and environmentally costly mistakes. The problem is
undoubtedly more complex than each group realizes and unquestiona-
bly will require more concessions than each group may be willing to
make.
VI. SUMMARY
Rapid changes during the past decades have made it difficult for
many utilities to avoid, or recover from, a capital crisis. Nuclear plant
cancellations and unwillingness on the part of PUCs to ease the capital
strain during prolonged construction periods have retarded utilities' ef-
forts to improve their financial health and provide adequate service.
The use of statutory language to deny cost recovery for cancelled
plants only worsens investors' negative perception of utilities involved
in unsuccessful nuclear projects.
It is not clear that statutory language relied on by some PUCs to
deny recovery is intended to apply to cancelled projects. If the statu-
tory language is so applied, however, it is constitutional. While a util-
ity, in the appropriate case, could prove that the "end result" of a rate
order is confiscatory, the failure of the PUC to set an adequate rate of
return, not the statute prohibiting cancellation cost recovery, would be
the cause of the constitutional infirmity. A carefully prepared case by
the utility could demonstrate the adverse effects on the utility of cost
recovery. A PUC then must respond by adjusting the rate formula,
probably by increasing the rate of return. Hence, in the long run, con-
sumers end up paying-and paying twice-because what they gain by
saving" cancellation costs, they lose in higher rates of return, as well
as in diminished utility stature in the capital markets.
VII. CONCLUSION
States that have not yet prohibited cancellation cost recovery by stat-
ute should avoid that path. Courts faced with construing utility stat-
utes should avoid finding cost recovery prohibitions where none are
evident in the statute. If a utility imprudently incurs any costs, they
may be excluded constitutionally from rate calculations. Prudently-
incurred costs should be recovered under operating expenses. In the
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case of "prudent" mistakes, the unamortized balance should not be ad-
ded to the rate base.
Careful regulatory supervision, along with prudent management, can
promote careful decision-making on utility expansion at a project's in-
ception and at its various stages. When mistakes occur, despite pru-
dent decision-making, the public interest requires that the investor and
consumer alike, who stand to benefit from a healthy utility, shoulder
the consequences. Alternative approaches may weaken a utility's fi-
nancial vitality and discourage creative long-term planning to meet fu-
ture power needs.
EPILOGUE
On February 26, 1985, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Propo-
sition One does not prohibit the Missouri Public Service Commission
from including costs of the abandoned Callaway II nuclear power plant
in charges to Union Electric's consumers, and remanded the case to the
PSC. State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, - S.W.2d
- (Mo. 1985) (en banc). See supra notes 156-61, 179-84, & 190-94
(discussion of Union Electric).
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